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SEMANTICS, SINCERITY AND SECTION 6(j):
WELSH v. UNITED STATES'
Whatever the reason, be it national conscience camouflaged under the doc-
trine of legislative grace or obedience to a belief in a constitutional require-
ment, the Government has historically provided exemption from military
service to those who "by reason of religious training and belief" are "con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."2
The pendulum of distinctions and discriminations in defining the phrase
"religious training and belief" has swung from one extreme to the other.
The different views appear in the form of opposing opinions among the
circuits, ranging from a more traditional orthodox interpretation which has
been held both constitutional and unconstitutional, to a broad philosophical
approach to a definition of religion which cures any constitutional defects.
Curiously, the divergent interpretations have all puported to achieve results
consistent with Congressional intent.
The Supreme Court has faced the problem of construing the conscientious
objector exemption, section 60) of the Draft Act of 19483 and its prede-
cessor, many times, most notably in United States v. Seeger4 and now
in Welsh v. United States.5 The controversy among the lower federal courts
has apparently been settled.
As of April 30, 1970 there were 9 to 10 million men in the 19 to 26-year
old group registered, of which approximately 1,500,000 were in classifications
available for military induction." About 40,000 men were registered in
conscientious objector exemption categories. 7 Welsh v. United States will add
to that 40,000.
Elliott Ashton Welsh, II was convicted in a United States District Court
of refusing to submit to induction into the Armed Forces in violation of 50
1 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
2 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
3 "Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person to be sub-
ject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the United States who, by
reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form. Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philo-
sophical views or a merely personal moral code." Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625,
§ 6(j), 62 Stat. 612-613 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 456(j) (1964).
4 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
5 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
6 L.A. Times, June 17, 1970, at 9, col. 1.
7 L.A. Daily Journal, June 16, 1970, at 1.
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U.S.C. App. section 462(a), and was, on June 1, 1966, sentenced to im-
prisonment for three years." One of the defenses was that section 60) of
the Universal Military Training and Service Act exempted him from combat
and noncombat service because he was "by reason of religious training and
belief ... conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."9
Welsh did not adhere to the teachings of or belong to any religious orga-
nizations. 10 He was not certain whether he believed in a Supreme Being
and originally characterized his beliefs as nonreligious, they having been
formed "by reading in the fields of history and sociology."' 1
He did, however, possess the belief that killing in war was wrong, unethi-
cal, and immoral and concluded that he could not "conscientiously comply
with the Government's insistence that [he] assume duties which [he felt
were] immoral and totally repugnant.'
' 2
After finding no religious basis for petitioner's conscientious objector
claim, the court of appeals, Judge Hamely dissenting, affirmed the con-
viction. 13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari "chiefly to review the
contention that Welsh's conviction should be set aside on the basis of this
Court's decision in United States v. Seeger."'
4
In reversing Welsh's conviction and finding him entitled to a conscientious
objector exemption under section 6(j), the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice Black, held:
That section exempts from military service all those whose consciences, spurred
by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace
if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.' 5
The Welsh majority' 6 did not find itnecessary to discuss the propriety of its
interpretation of section 60) in relation to the Congressional intent or pur-
pose behind its enactment, because the Court felt its decision was a mere
reaffirmation of the Seeger interpretation of section 60), not an extension.
For this reason, and because Welsh was found exempted from military sev-
ice, the majority opinion did not reach the constitutional issues raised by
his counsel.
The majority in Welsh viewed the facts in this case as "strikingly similar
to those in Seeger."'
7
8 398 U.S. at 335.
9 Id., quoting Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. App. 456(j) (1964).
10 398 U.S. at 336.
11 Id. at 341.
12 Id. at 337, 343.
13 404 F.2d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 1968).
14 398 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted).
15 398 U.S. at 344.
16 Majority opinion by Justice Black with whom Justice Douglas, Justice Brennan,
and Justice Marshall joined, 398 U.S. at 335.
'7 Id.
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Both Seeger and Welsh developed their views against war subsequent to
their registration for the draft. Both made application to their local draft
boards for conscientious objector exemptions.
In filling out their exemption applications both Seeger and Welsh were un-
able to sign the statement which, as printed in the Selective Service System
Form,' 8 stated "I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Seeger struck out
the words "training and", put quotation marks around the word "reli-
gious" and then signed the form. Welsh struck out the words "religious
training and", and then signed.
Neither Seeger nor Welsh could affirm or deny belief in a "Supreme
Being". Both stated that they preferred to leave the question open.' 9
Both held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where
people were killed. "Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong,
unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part
in such an evil practice. '20
Moreover, in Welsh, as in Seeger, there was never any question as to the
sincerity with which the beliefs were held.21 The problem in both cases was
that the Selective Service System found that the beliefs of both Seeger and
Welsh were insufficient to qualify them for conscientious objector exemp-
tions. 22
By contending that Welsh is a mere reaffirmation of Seeger, the Court at-
tributed to Seeger the concept that those whose opposition to war is based
upon ethical or moral grounds are entitled to exemption. At best, such a
position is extremely dubious; in fact there are good reasons to believe that it
is untenable.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion23 recognized the majority opin-
ion as being an extension of the Seeger interpretation of section 6(j). He
went on to find that under a proper interpretation of section 6(j), the Es-
tablishment Clause 24 of the First Amendment was violated, and then cured
the constitutional defect in a way which reached the same result as the ma-
jority opinion.
The dissenting opinion of Justice White, with whom the Chief Justice and
Justice Stewart joined, also recognized the majority opinion as an extension
of Seeger, and not in accord with legislative intent, but found that the proper
18 Selective Service System Form 150. The Form has since been amended. See 32
C.F.R. § 1621.11 (1971).
19 398 U.S. at 337.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 337-38.
23 Id. at 344-67.
24 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ..
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
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construction of section 6(j) does not violate the Establishment Clause and
is constitutional in all respects.
25
A close look at the Court's analysis and interpretation of Seeger indicates
that the majority has indeed extended the Seeger interpretation of section
6(j). A determination of the question of extension is important for several
reasons.
The constitutionality of section 6(j) was discussed in Seeger. That
Court dispensed with the constitutional attacks on section 6(j) by holding
that the petitioners construed the section too narrowly and under its broader
interpretation the section was constitutional. Consequently, if the Welsh
decision did indecd merely apply the Seeger test then the issue is whether
Welsh falls within the protected class of conscientious objectors as defined
by Seeger. On the other hand, if the holding in Welsh is an extension of the
Seeger test then two questions are raised. First, is such an extended interpre-
tation of section 6(j) in accord with legislative intent, and second, if in light
of a proper interpretation of Congressional purpose Welsh is denied an exemp-
tion, is section 6(j) constitutional?
The next reason is a practical one. The threshold question in all con-
scientious objector exemption claims is the sincerity of the registrant.2 6 A
registrant who files for conscientious objector exemption late in his Selec-
tive Service career, for example a few months before his induction notice is
to arrive, may be looked upon by his local board members and his appeal
board as being insincere. The "lateness" of a conscientious objector claim
has been held to be objective evidence of insincerity in more than a few
cases.2 7 Consequently, where a registrant who is an ethical, rather than a
religious, conscientious objector files for exemption after Welsh and late in
his Selective Service career, the sincerity of the registrant's claim is drawn
into question.
However, if Welsh is understood as representing "new law" in that Seeger
only exempted religious conscientious objectors 28 and Welsh extends the
Seeger interpretation of section 6(j) to exempt non-religious objectors as
well, then the registrant has a valid reason for his "lateness".
Since most of the publicity surrounding the Welsh decision characterized
that holding as "new law", 29 the registrant can provide an explanation for
his "lateness" to his local board by showing that the cause of his present
25 398 U.S. at 367-74.
26 380 U.S. at 185.
27 United States v. Henderson, 411 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S.
916 (1970) and cases cited therein.
28 380 U.S. at 176.
29 In commenting on the Welsh decision, the new head of the Selective Service Sys-
tem, Director Curtis W. Tarr, was quoted as saying, "There is little question that many
young men who felt themselves unlikely to qualify as conscientious objectors now will
find reason to apply." L.A. Times, June 17, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
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claim was the realization that the Welsh decision now extends conscien-
tious objector exemption to his non-religious opposition to war.
And finally, the determination of this question is also important when one
considers that only four Justices supported the majority's opinion.A0 In
considering future litigation in this area, it should thus be noted that a slight
change in the make-up of the Court could bring about a different hold-
ing in those cases. If Welsh is found to be an extension of the Seeger doc-
trine, then seemingly the broad construction of section 6(j) advanced by the
majority in Seeger without dissent, would still be good law, even if subsequent
decisions find Welsh to go beyond the limits intended by Congress in es-
tablishing this exemption.
If, on the other hand, Welsh is a proper interpretation of Seeger, then a
finding that Welsh misconstrued legislative intent would necessarily bring
about the fall of Seeger, as well as Welsh. One should remember that the
majority in Seeger interpreted section 6(j) to avoid constitutional difficulties
and therefore, with that holding invalid, the constitutional questions could
very well be before the Court again, with the conscientious objector
exemption facing a possible threat of invalidation.31
Therefore, with the importance of the issue in mind, is Welsh an extension
of Seeger?
The Seeger Court began its inquiry into the meaning of "religious train-
ing and belief" by first "noting briefly those scruples expressly excepted from
the definition. '3 2 The Court concluded that "[t]he section excludes those
persons who, disavowing religious belief, decide on the basis of essentially
political, sociological or economic considerations that war is wrong and that
they will have no part of it."'33 The Court also expressly asserted that there
was no issue before them concerning the claims of an atheist.84
Having found that Congress, in using the words "religious training and
belief", intended a broader concept of "a power or being, or ... a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately depen-
dent",35 rather than a restriction to a traditional belief in God, and again em-
phasizing that "all of the parties here purport to base their objection on reli-
gious belief", the Court propounded their now famous rationale for granting
Seeger conscientious objector exemption under section 6 (j) :
30 See note 16 supra. Justice Blackmun did not take part in the decision.
31 Justice Douglas, concurring in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 188 (1965),
stated:
If I read the statute differently from the Court, I would have difficulties. For
then those who embraced one religious faith rather than another would be subject
to penalties; and that kind of discrimination . . . would violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
32 Id. at 173.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 176.
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A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption
comes within the statutory definition.8 6
The Seeger Court took the position that its requirements were no dif-
ferent from those required under the Act of 1940,37 and that "[the] task is
to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and
whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious." 38
Justice Black, speaking for the majority in Welsh, argued that:
The reference to the registrant's "own scheme of things" was intended to indicate
that the central consideration in determining whether the registrant's beliefs are
religious is whether these beliefs play the role of a religion and function as a
religion in the reg'strant's life. (emphasis added) 39
This is the foundation for the Court's construction of an opinion which
finally holds that either "moral, ethical or religious" beliefs qualify for ex-
emption under section 6(j). The structure is only as strong as its supporting
foundation, and this foundation has serious weaknesses.
The important issue here is whether a sincerely held belief, one which
functions as a religion in the registrant's life, is equivalent to a sincerely held
belief which is "in his own scheme of things, religious."
It would seem that a belief which functions as a religious belief need not
be religious in any sense. Long debates cbuld no doubt result from the ab-
stract question of whether a belief functioning in a person's life as a religion
should be accordingly referred to as a religious belief, but one should re-
member that, considering the opinion of the Welsh majority, the term "re-
ligious belief" was supposedly construed as the Seeger majority meant it to be.
Admittedly, moral or ethical beliefs may be held with all the strength and
fervor of religious beliefs by some to the extent that they might function as
religious beliefs. But to the Seeger majority these beliefs were not the equiv-
alent of religious beliefs within the meaning of section 6(j). This fact is il-
luminated by an examination of the case of an atheistic objector.
36 Id.
37 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 885.
38 380 U.S. at 185. The phrase "religious training" has been of little importance
since Seeger. In fact, consistent with the broad interpretation given to the phrase "re-
ligious belief", there can be no requirement that the applicant have had any formalized,
institutionalized religious training. Hence, in United States v. Haffner, 301 F. Supp.
828 (D. Hawaii 1969), the court in reversing the local boards denial of a conscientious
objector claim because the registrant had no "religious training", said that such a con-
clusion by the local board
indicate[s] conclusively that the decision of the Local Board to retain defendant
in class I-A was based upon the now impermissible distinction between a belief
"due to religious training" and "religious belief'.
The clear implication of the decision of the Local Board, namely that a belief
based on religious training is a prerequisite to granting conscientious objector status,
cannot stand in light of Seeger. . . . Id. at 830.
39 398 U.S. at 339.
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In United States v. Shacter,40 it was said that a registrant who was an
atheist in the sense that "he claimed no belief at all that was a product of
faith. . . would not under [6(j)] be entitled to classification as a conscien-
tious objector" 41 as that court interpreted Seeger.
However, it would seem that the majority's statement in Welsh, that a be-
lief which functions as a religion in a registrant's life would entitle him to
exemption under section 6(j), grants exemption to an avowed atheist. An
atheist who has a sincere conscientious objection to war could be said to have
a belief which functions as a religion in his life. Yet, the Seeger Court ex-
pressly held that it was not deciding the status of an avowed atheist under
section 6(j).42
In short, could not any strongly, deeply, and sincerely held view opposing
participation in war function as a religion in the registrant's life yet not
be, in his own scheme of things, religious? Numerous cases since Seeger
and before Welsh have also shown an intention to grant exemption under
section 6(j) only to those whose beliefs are "religious" in content, although
admittingly dropping the requirement of "religious training". 43 The only in-
dication that Seeger might include non-religious beliefs is found in statements
such as the one made in United States v. Levy:44 "Any type of sincerely held
belief opposing war generally would be difficult to rule out under Seeger."'' 4
This was dicta, and also a long way from the unequivocal statements qualify-
ing secular beliefs for exemption that were made in Welsh.46
The Welsh Court does more than merely extend the Seeger definition of
what a religious belief is. In interpreting the exclusionary phrase of sec-
tion 6(j), the Court also goes beyond the limits set forth in Seeger.
The Government contended that Welsh's views, distinguished from those of
40 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968).
41 Id. at 1063.
42 380 U.S. at 173.
43 Cases showing that § 6(j) under Seeger requires a "religious" content in the regis-
trant's beliefs are: United States v. Neamand, 302 F. Supp. 1296 (M.D. Pa. 1969);
United States v. Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968); United States v. Pres-
cott, 301 F. Supp. 1116 (D.N.H. 1969). See also United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp.
902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970) where § 6(j) was de.
cared unconstitutional because it discriminates between religious beliefs and non-re-
ligious beliefs; accord, Goguen v. Clifford, 304 F. Supp. 958 (D.N.J. 1969). In addi-
tion, there are two recent cases holding § 6(j) unconstitutional in that it discriminates
between religious objection to some wars and objection to all wars. In both cases, the
presumption is that § 6(j) exempts only religious conscientious objectors. United States
v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970); United States v. Bowen, 2 SSLR 3421
(N.D. Cal. 1969).
44 419 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1969).
45 Id. at 368.
46 The court in Levy was only concerned with the "religious content" of the regis-
trant's beliefs. There are few cases, if any, expressly holding that under Seeger beliefs
which are purely "moral, ethical, or religious" qualify for conscientious objector exemp-
tion, as does the majority opinion here.
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Seeger, were "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code."
'47
Welsh did base his conscientious objection to war in part on his perception
of world politics. 48 The Welsh majority, however, easily avoided this pitfall
by concluding that:
Once the Selective Service System has taken the first step and determined under
the standards set out here and in Seeger that the registrant is a "religious" con-
scientious objector, it follows that his views cannot be "essentially political, socio-
logical, or philosophical." Nor can they be a "merely personal code."4 9
The majority also stated that the "exclusion of those persons with essen-
tially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code" from conscientious objector exemption under section 6(j) should not
be read so as to exclude from exemption:
those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those
whose conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to a substan-
tial extent upon considerations of public policy. (emphasis added) 5 0
What, then, is the status of the word "essentially" in section 6(j)?
Take, for example, the situation of a registrant who, in the words of Seeger,
"disavow[s] any religious belief." 51  Under Seeger if this same registrant
"decide[s] on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic con-
siderations that war is wrong and that [he] will have no part of it,"52 he
falls within the exclusionary phrase and ought to be denied exemption under
the section.
However, under Welsh, if the same person who has "disavowed" any re-
ligious belief, maintains an ethical or moral conscientious objection to war
based substantially upon public policy, he does not fall within the exclusionary
phrase and may obtain a conscientious objector exemption.
The Court went on to say that there were two groups which "obviously"
do fall within the exclusionary phrase:
[11 those whose beliefs are not deeply held and
[2] those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or reli-
gious principle but instead rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragma-
tism, or expediency. (emphasis added) 5 3
To the first group of persons Welsh lists as persons who "obviously" do
fall within the exclusion, the word "obviously" is appropriate. Under any
interpretation of 6(j), be it that of General Hershey, Seeger, or Welsh, the
47 398 U.S. at 342, quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
48 398 U.S. at 342.
49 Id. at 343.
50 Id. at 342.
51 380 U.S. at 173.
52 Id.
53 398 U.S. at 342-43.
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belief must be sincerely held to qualify for exemption.
However, the manner in which the Court defined the second excluded
class creates interpretive problems. By the use of the word "solely", did the
Court intend that only in those cases where a registrant's objection to war
rests "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency" is
he to fall within the exclusionary phrase? Or was the Court truly stating the
"obvious" by saying anyone whose objection to war rests "solely" upon
these improper criteria is to be denied exemption under section 6(j)? 4
Moreover, the Welsh Court has replaced the words in section 6(j)'s exclu-
sionary clause (political, sociological, and philosophical) with "policy, prag-
matism, and expediency."
The Welsh Court's liberal construction of section 6(j) does extend the
limits of the conscientious objector exemption far beyond the range of the
Court's holding in Seeger. By equating beliefs that function as a religion
with religious beliefs, the majority in Welsh includes within the reach of this
exemption applicants who could not obtain such an exemption under Seeger.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, also recognized the fact that the
majority opinion is an extension of Seeger rather than a mere reaffirma-
tion.55 And the three dissenters expressly agreed:
Whether or not United States v. Seeger accurately reflected the intent of Congress
in providing draft exemptions for religious conscientious objectors to war, I can-
not join today's construction of § 6(j) extending draft exemption to those who
disclaim religious objections to war and whose views about war represent a purely
personal code arising not from religious training and belief as the statute re-
quires but from readings in philosophy, history, and sociology.5 6
When the majority opinion in Welsh is realistically recognized as a broader
interpretation of section 6(j) than the Seeger holding, and considering the
doubts raised as to the propriety of the Seeger interpretation, one is im-
mediately faced with the question whether this broadening of section 6(j)
is a proper exercise in judicial statutory construction.
The issue in this case, to use the words of Justice Harlan, is "whether
Welsh's opposition to war is founded on 'religious training and belief' and
hence 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being' as Congress used those
words", 57 and the test for this issue is fixed by an inspection of the Con-
gressional language with respect to "the context of its usage and legislative
history . . .- 5
"Governmental recognition of the moral dilemma posed for persons of cer-
54 United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401, 404 (9th Cir. 1970), suggests that exclu-
sion from the § 60) exemption applies only against the enumerated groups.
55 398 U.S. at 344-45.
56 Dissenting opinion by Justice White, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart joined, 398 U.S. at 367 (citation omitted).
57 Id. at 346.
58 Id. at 347.
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tain religious faiths by the call to arms came early in the history of this
county."59
Federal statutory recognition came with the Federal Conscription Act of
1863, and in the 1864 Draft Act 60 exemptions were extended to those
conscientious objectors who were members of religious denominations op-
posed to the bearing of arms and who were prohibited from doing so by the
articles of faith of their denominations. 61
The Draft Act of 191762 afforded "exemptions to conscientious objec-
tors who were affiliated with a 'well-recognized religious sect or organization
[then] organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles [for-
bade] its members to participate in war in any form."'63
The 1940 Selective Training and Service Act removed the requirement of
affiliation with a "well-recognized religious sect or organization" from the
law by providing that:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be sub-
ject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form.64
The phrase "by reason of religious training and belief" became the cen-
ter of controversy between 1940 and 1948 when two courts of appeal ex-
pressed different viewpoints as to its intended meaning. These conflicting
viewpoints are represented by the decisions of United States v. Kauten6 5
and Berman v. United States.66
In Kauten, the Second Circuit, while holding that the applicant's views
did not satisfy the act's requirements, expressly unveiled its concept of what
beliefs would qualify for an exemption under this Act. The court distin-
guished a course of reasoning which would result in a conviction that a par-
ticular war was wrong from a conscientious objection to participation in
any war and then stated:
The latter, and not the former, may be the basis of exemption under the Act. The
former is usually a political objection while the latter, we think, may justly be re-
garded as a response of the individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or
God, that is for many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always
been thought a religious impulse. (emphasis added) 67
59 380 U.S. at 170.
60 Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
61 380 U.S. at 171, citing CONSCEmNTIOUS OBJECTION 40-41 (SELECTIVE SERVICE
MONOGRAPH No. 11 1950).
62 Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
63 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 171 (1965), quoting Act of May 18, 1917,
ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
64 Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
65 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
60 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
57 133 F.2d at 708.
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That the court intended to extend the exemption to a class of beliefs beyond
the scope of traditional religion is illustrated by its description of an "in-
ward mentor" as either God or conscience.
The fact that the Second Circuit intended not to restrict the exemption to
religious beliefs in the traditional sense is substantiated by that court's deci-
sions in two subsequent cases.
In United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer,8 the applicant's opposition
to war was based on a general humanitarian concept which he described
as "essentially religious in character."69 The court in answering the Gov-
ernment's claim that the oppostion to war must be traceable to some religious
belief or training stated:
But if a stricter rule than was announced in the Kauten case is called for, one de-
manding a belief which cannot be found among the philosophers, but only among
religious teachers of recognized organizations, then we are substantially or nearly
back to the requirement of the Act of 1917 .... 70
The court then concluded by quoting from the Kauten decision, holding
that the provisions of the 1940 statute "make the existence of a conscientious
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a definite reli-
gious group or creed, the basis for exemption."'71
In United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt,72 the applicant denied that he be-
lieved in a deity. 73 Yet, the court remanded the case; from the evidence
it appeared that a conscientious objector exemption was denied him solely be-
cause his opposition to war was not based upon an obligation to a deity and
therefore was in violation of Kauten.74
In contrast to the Second Circuit's decisions is the decision by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Berman v. United States.75 In that
case the appellent argued that "a person's philosophy of life or his political
point of view, to which his conscience directs him to adhere devotedly, or
his devotion to human welfare without the concept of deity, may be religious
in nature." 76 The court, in denying appellant's claim said:
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training and belief'
is plain language, and was written into the statute for the specific purpose of
distinguishing between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion to a high
moralistic philosophy, and one based upon an individual's belief in his responsi-
bility to an authority higher and beyond any worldly one.77
68 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
69 Id. at 523.
70 Id. at 524.
71 Id.; United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943).
72 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 817 (1946).
"8 Id. at 846.
74 Id. at 847, 849.
75 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946).
76 Id. at 378.
77 Id. at 380.
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The Ninth Circuit, by making this distinction and impliedly eliminating
social, moral and philosophic beliefs from the statute's cover was laying the
foundation for its conclusion that to be religious within the meaning of the
statute, one had to believe in a deity.
The court referred to the words of Chief Justice Hughes, dissenting
in United States v. Macintosh:78 "The essence of religion is belief in a re-
lation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human re-
lation. ' 70 It then concluded:
However, no matter how pure and admirable his standard may be, and no matter
how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy with-
out the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense of that term as
it is used in the statute.80
These two schools of thought were ever present when, in 1948, Congress
amended the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and declared that
religious training and belief was to be defined as "an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code."8'
The legislature's definition of religious training and belief was the only addi-
tion to the 1940 Act. In fact, the report of the Senate Armed Services
Committee recommending adoption reads:
This section reenacts substantially the same provisions as were found in subsection
5(g) of the 1940 act. Exemption extends to anyone who, because of religious train-
ing and belief in his relationship to a Supreme Being, is conscientiously op-
posed to combatant military service or to both combatant and noncombatant mili-
tary service [citing Berman v. United States].82
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Congress, in amending the 1940
Act, intended to solve the dispute that existed between the different circuits
of the Court of Appeals and accepted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in
Berman as the national standard. This is evident for two reasons. The
first is the obvious fact that the Senate Report cites Berman. The second
is that Congress in adopting this section defined religious training and belief
almost word for word from the Berman Court's interpretation of the same
language.
8 3
It should be remembered that the Berman majority used the words of Chief
Justice Hughes in defining religious training and belief as a "belief in a rela-
tion to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human rela-
78 283 U.S. 605, 633 (1931).
79 Id. at 633-34.
80 156 F.2d at 381.
81 Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 as amended, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 4560) (1964).
82 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
83 156 F.2d at 381.
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tion.' '8 4 Congress substituted the words "Supreme Being" for "God" but
otherwise the wording is identical.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Welsh, attached great signi-
ficance to these two factors in concluding that Congress by section 6(j)
deemed to distinguish between theistic and non-theistic religions. In his
opinion he stated
[tihat Congress intended to anoint the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 5(g)
would seem beyond question in view of the similarity of the statutory language to
that used by Chief Justice Hughes in his dissenting opinion in Macintosh and
quoted in Berman and the Senate report.85
In 1965, the Court in Seeger was faced with an applicant who desired to
leave the question of his belief in God open and, in finding him entitled to a
conscientious objector exemption, was forced to interpret these references
to the Berman opinion in a manner consistent with its conclusions. To find
that Seeger was not entitled to an exemption would have required the Court
to consider the constitutional question presented to it by the Court of Ap-
peals.86
One must give the Seeger Court credit for the ingenuity it demonstrated
in reconciling its conclusion with the intent of the Congress in enacting sec-
tion 6(j). The Court, confronted with a statute that defined a religious be-
lief as a belief in a "Supreme Being," recognized the "vast panoply of be-
liefs"87 prevalent in the United States and assuming that the Congress would
not deviate from "its long-established policy of not picking and choosing
among religious beliefs",88 interpreted the meaning of religious training and
belief so as to "embrace all religions".89
The majority's opinion in Seeger raises questions about their interpreta-
tion of the legislature's intent. It is not easy to accept their conclusion that
section 6(j), which referred at that time to belief in a relation to a Supreme
Being and is impliedly founded on a holding that one must have a belief in a
deity in order to qualify for exemption, embraces all religions.
The Seeger majority attempted to appease any such criticism of their inter-
pretation by discussing these subjects. They recognized the similarity in
language of section 6(j) with the views expressed by Chief Justice Hughes,
and concluded that it was apparent that Congress deliberately broadened the
Chief Justice's language by substituting the phrase "Supreme Being" for that
of "God". 90 It then noted the Senate Report stating that Congress was
substantially reenacting the 1940 Act and stated:
84 Id.
85 398 U.S. at 349.
86 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964).
87 380 U.S. at 175.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 165.
90 Id. at 175.
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Under the 1940 Act it was necessary only to have a conviction based upon religious
training and belief; we believe that is all that is required here. Within that phrase
would come all sincere religious beliefs which are based upon a power or being,
or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent.91
The conclusion of the Seeger majority then, was that the addition to the
statute of a definition which expresses religious training and belief in terms
of a relation to a Supreme Being does not in any way change the meaning
of that statute.
In one sense the Seeger Court was correct; this amendment was purely a
clarification of the then existing law. The difficulty with the Seeger approach
is that the Court perceived that, both before and after the amendment, Kau-
ten and Berman were consonant. It was not therefore precluded from adopt-
ing the Kauten standard simply because Congress alluded to Berman and
language found therein. The Seeger position on this point is indefensible.
The Kauten standard exhibited a broad interpretation of religious train-
ing and belief while the majority in Berman construed the language of the
statute very strictly. It would seem that the section 6(j) definition defines
limits to what a religious belief can be by excluding those beliefs not held in
a relation to a Supreme Being.92  Such a construction is not consistent with
the principles set forth in Kauten, but instead is a narrow construction con-
sistent and in accord with the Berman holding.
Clearly, the Seeger Court, in construing section 6(j) to mean nothing more
than a reaffirmation of the 1940 Act, necessarily overlooks the legislature's
attempts to clarify and limit the conscientious objector exemption.
That Congress was attempting to adopt the Berman standard is further
substantiated by the citation to Berman in the Senate report.93 The Seeger
Court felt that this citation was entirely proper because certiorari was
denied in Berman and not in Kauten. But, if the Court was implying that
the Berman decision carried greater weight because of denial of certiorari,
such an implication is contrary to a long-standing Supreme Court view that
denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion on the merits of the
case, and carries with it no implication whatever regarding the Supreme Court's
views of the merits of the case, or no support of the lower court decision nor of
any of the views in the opinion supporting it .... 94
In light of the statute's and Berman's similarity in language, it is hard to
perceive how the Seeger Court put so little emphasis on the citation if it was
truly trying to construe the legislature's intent. It should be remembered
that under the Kauten standard, beliefs stemming from either God or con-
91 Id. at 176.
92 Such as beliefs based on Taoism and Buddhism.
93 S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
94 32 AM. JuR. 2d Federal Practice and Procedure § 229 at 682 (1967) (footnotes
omitted).
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science could qualify for exemption 95 while under Berman one's beliefs must
have been derived from an obligation to God.90 Yet the Court seemed
oblivious to this interpretational battle and dismissed the problem by stating
that there was no indication of "congressional concern over any conflict
between Kauten and Berman. Surely, if it thought that two clashing inter-
pretations as to what amounted to 'religious belief' had to be resolved, it
would have said so somewhere in its deliberations. ' '0 7 In other words the
Senate report, rather than simply citing Berman, should have cited Ber-
man and included a notation not to cite Kauten.
The Court then expresses the view that Berman was cited not for what a
religious belief is but for what it is not, noting that Kauten and Berman agree
that exemption is denied to those whose beliefs are essentially political, so-
ciological, or philosophical.98 It should be recognized that nowhere did
the Senate report concern itself with the question of what a religious belief
was not.9 9
The fact is that Kauten and Berman are utterly hostile to each other. The
fact is that the Senate report cited Berman. The fact is that the Hughes
definition of religious belief was almost in its entirety adopted into the stat-
ute. The fact is that Congress did define religious training and belief in
terms of a relation to a Supreme Being and excluded those whose beliefs
are essentially political, philosophical, or sociological or a mere personal
moral code.
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion stated:
In my opinion, the liberties taken with the statute both in Seeger and today's de-
cision cannot be justified in the name of the familiar doctrine of construing federal
statutes in a manner that will avoid possible constitutional infirmities in them.100
He considered the majority opinion as a
wholly emasculated construction of a statute to avoid facing a latent constitutional
question, in purported fidelity to the salutory doctrine of avoiding unnecessary
resolution of constitutional issues .... [citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority]' 0'
Justice Harlan's reference to Ashwander was in approval of the limits of
statutory construction as delineated by the concurring opinion of Justice
Brandeis:
When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious
doubt of unconstitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' 0 2
95 133 F.2d at 708.
96 156 F.2d at 381.
97 380 U.S. at 178.
98 Id.
99 S. REP. No. 1268, supra note 93.
100 398 U.S. at 345.
101 Id. at 354 (citations omitted).
102 297 U.S. at 348.
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Further reference is made to Aptheker v. Secretary of State,103 which dis-
cussed the permissible limits within which the Court may construe a possibly
unconstitutional statute in order to save it. A construction which "perverts"
the purpose of the legislation is impermissible.
Realistically, the Seeger Court's construction of section 6(j) was not in
harmony with the will of Congress. It is arguable, however, that the
Court's interpretation was not so discordant as to pervert Congressional in-
tent in view of the fact that Seeger expressly required religious belief of
some kind as a condition of exemption.
On the other hand, since Welsh extends Seeger, it may fail the test which
Seeger has passed. The purpose and intent of section 6(j) is clearly per-
verted when it is construed so as to embrace religious and non-religious views
alike. A statutory construction which embraces beliefs of a class expressly
authorized to receive its benefits, as well as beliefs of a class expressly ex-
cluded from its benefits, is not justifiable under the doctrine of avoiding the
constitutional question. Such questions are latent in a proper interpretation
of the kind of statute involved here. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, "An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot
be judicially supplied however much later wisdom may recommend the in-
clusion.'
0 4
Justice Harlan concluded rather sarcastically:
Its justification cannot be by resort to legislative intent, as that term is usually
employed, but by a different kind of legislative intent, namely the presumed grant
of power to the courts to decide whether it more nearly accords with Congress'
wishes to eliminate its policy altogether or extend it in order to render what Con-
gress plainly did intend, constitutional.10 5
A finding that the Welsh Court did not properly construe the legislative
intent in enacting section 6(j) presents a second major problem. In the
words of Justice Harlan:
I therefore find myself unable to escape facing the constitutional issue that this
case squarely presents: whether § 6(j) in limiting this draft exemption to those
opposed to war in general because of theistic beliefs runs afoul of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment.10 6
The majority of course, did not reach the constitutional issue. The broad
interpretation which the majority gave to section 6(j) eliminated any con-
103 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964).
104 Frankfurter, Reflections on Reading Statutes in THE SUPREME COURT: VIEWS
FROM INSmE 74 (A. Westin ed. 1961).
105 398 U.S. at 355-56. Furthermore, it should be noted that as Justice Frankfurter
points out, the word "intent" as used here and in Justice Harlan's discussion, does not
mean that a court should delve into the minds of the legislators, but rather "legislative in-
tent" is synonomous with "legislative purpose" which does not require a psychoanalysis
of the legislators. Frankfurter, supra note 104, at 74, 86.
106 398 U.S. at 345.
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stitutional difficulties with respect to the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.
Justice Harlan, in rejecting the majority's broad interpretation for the nar-
rower construction discussed above, found section 6(j) violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause and hence unconstitutional.
On the other hand, Justice White in his dissent also rejected the majority
interpretation and accepted the same construction of section 6j) as Justice
Harlan, but did not believe that the Section contravened the Establishment
Clause.
Before discussing the Establishment Clause issue, Justice Harlan dis-
posed of the argument that the Constitution requires exemption of consci-
entious objectors. He stated that Congress could constitutionally eliminate
all exemptions. He cited his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner,07 for its prop-
osition that such a course would be wholly neutral and would not offend the
Free Exercise Clause.108
In Sherbert, the appellant was a Seventh-day Adventist who was unable
to work on Saturdays. She was therefore deemed "unavailable for work"
and denied compensation under a South Carolina unemployment statute.
However, persons who, for religious reasons refused to work on Sunday were
exempted from the statute's "unavailable for work" limitation.
In his dissent in Sherbert,0 9 with which Justice White joined, Justice Har-
lan could not
subscribe to the conclusion that the State is constitutionally compelled to carve out
an exception to its general rule of eligibility in the present case. Those situations
in which the Constitution may require special treatment on account of religion are,
in my view, few and far between,.1...10
And in Dickinson v. United States,"" it was noted that an exemption
is a matter of legislative grace and thus "the Selective Service registrant
bears the burden of clearly establishing a right to the exemption.""12
Having found that Congress is not compelled to grant exemptions, Jus-
tice Harlan next questioned whether Congress, having created the exemption,
did so constitutionally. At first, he stated the issue quite narrowly:
[W]hether a statute that defers to the individual's conscience only when his views
emanate from adherence to theistic religious beliefs is within the power of
Congress." 3-
1o 374 U.S. 398, 418 (1963).
108 398 U.S. at 356.
109 374 U.S. at 418.
110 Id. at 423. See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacob-
sen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (dictum); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878).
111 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
112 Id. at 395.
113 398 U.S. at 356.
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This statement of the issue places undue emphasis upon the "Supreme
Being" clause of the 1948 Amendment. A declaration that section 6(j) is
unconstitutional only because the section discriminates between theistic and
non-theistic religious beliefs would have no effect on the present conscien-
tious objector exemption section because of the 1967 Amendment' 1 4
which deleted the "Supreme Being" clause.
Justice Harlan appeared cognizant of the problem:
The constitutional infirmity [of § 6(j)] cannot be cured, moreover, even by an
impermissible construction that eliminates the theistic requirement and simply
draws the line between religious and nonreligious. This in my view offends the
Establishment Clause and is that kind of classification that this Court has con-
demned.11
Hence, the crux of the constitutional question is the issue of whether
a statute that defers to the individual conscience only when his views emanate
from adherence to religious beliefs, theistic or non-theistic, is within the power
of Congress.
It was the view of Justice Harlan that Congress' choice to exclude non-reli-
gious persons from a conscientious objector exemption is incompatible with
with the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."1 6 Justice Harlan
stated that to conform with the requirements of the First Amendment's
religious clauses, the legislation must be "neutral".
His view was that an implementation of the neutrality principle requires
"an equal protection mode of analysis."117  He explained that:
In any particular case the critical question is whether the scope of legislation en-
circles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that [all groups that]
could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter [are included].118
Since Justice Harlan believed that section 6(j) cannot logically be con-
strued to exempt non-religious exemptors," 9 the section must be unconsti-
tutional. He relied upon past Supreme Court decisions to support his posi-
tion. A review of these decisions will show that Justice Harlan views the
neutrality principle as having a dual function. It forbids not only govern-
mental preference of one religion over another, but also forbids governmen-
tal preference of religion over non-religion.
In Walz v. Tax Commission, 20 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion,
agreed with the majority holding that a grant of property tax exemption to re-
ligious organizations for properties used solely for religious worship was not
violative of the Establishment Clause. Principally he concurred because the
breadth of the statute was such that the tax exemption was extended to non-
114 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. V, 1970).
115 398 U.S. at 357-58.
116 Id. at 356.
"7 Id. at 357.
118 Id., quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970).
"19 Id. at 357-58.
120 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
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religious groups involved in "cultural, moral, or spiritual improvement" as
well as similarly active religious groups.121
Section 6(j) may be distinguished from Walz on this very ground. This
is not a statute which grants conscientious objector exemption to religious
and non-religious beliefs against war; on the contrary, it grants exemption
solely to religious objectors.
On this point, Justice Harlan stated that "If the exemption is to be given
application, it must encompass the class of individuals it purports to ex-
clude, those whose beliefs emanate from a purely moral, ethical, or philo-
sophical source.' 22 In such a situation, the principle of "neutrality" would
be achieved. The statute on the one hand would not violate the Establish-
ment Clause in that religion would not be the sole criterion to be within the
statute's benefits, and on the other hand it would provide for the Free Exer-
cise of all religions.
In Engel v. Vitale, 23 the Supreme Court in a 6-1 decision held a public
school system's admittedly nonsectarian prayer was unconstitutionally an
establishment of religion. The prayer was not "neutral" in the sense that re-
ligious prayer prefers religion in general over non-religious activities.
In Walz, Justice Harlan cited with approval Justice Goldberg's statement
in Abington School District v. Schempp:1
2 4
The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither en-
gage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or
between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious be-
lief.125
The Schempp case also involved the reading of "denominationally neutral"
religious prayers in a public school system.
And more specifically in Torcaso v. Watkins,126 it was said that the
state cannot
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can [it] aid those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.' 2 7
It is plain that there is support for Justice Harlan's position that section
6(j) is unconstitutional. A logical construction of that statute, which was
enacted as a matter of legislative grace rather than compulsion, is that Con-
gress indeed favored religious over non-religious objectors in violation of
the Establishment Clause.
The dissenting opinion written by Justice White accepted Justice Harlan's
121 Id. at 697.
122 398 U.S. at 358.
123 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
124 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (concurring opinion).
125 397 U.S. at 695, quoting 374 U.S. at 305.
126 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
127 Id. at 495 (footnotes omitted).
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construction of section 6(j) but rejected his proposition that the section
violates the Establishment Clause:
1 28
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan, said in a separate
opinion in the Sunday Closing Law Cases. .. , an establishment contention "can
prevail only if the absence of any substantial legislative purpose other than a re-
ligious one is made to appear."1 29
Justice White found that section 6(j) has a "substantial legislative pur-
pose" other than a religious one. He believed that the exemption was de-
signed to maximize the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, not to bestow
benefits upon religious objectors. 30 However, the quotation upon which
Justice White relied has been taken out of context. Justice Frankfurter was
careful to qualify his statement:
Or if a statute furthers both secular and religious ends by means unnecessary to the
effectuation of the secular ends alone-where the same secular ends could equally
be attained by means which do not have consequences for promotion of religion-
the statute cannot stand.' 3 '
This is precisely the situation in the case at hand. Justice White was en-
tirely correct in his assertion that section 6(j)'s primary purpose is purely sec-
ular. But he does not recognize that a sincere non-religious conscientious ob.
jector is no more prepared to undertake the fighting than a sincere religious
conscientious objector. And as indicated by Justice Harlan, Congress could
just as well have included sincere non-religious objectors within the exemp-
tion of section 6(j), thus securing the secular ends of conscripting only indi-
viduals ready to fight which Justice White considers the primary purpose of
the section, without the consequences of promoting religion.
Another basis for Justice White's contention that section 6(j) does not
violate the Establishment Clause was that Congress may have granted this
exemption because to force religious objectors into conduct which their re-
ligions forbid might violate the Free Exercise Clause "or at least raise grave
problems in this respect."'1
32
Precedent is plainly against this proposition. In Hamilton v. Regents of
the University of California33 the Court said:
The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedi-
ence to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only be-
cause, it has been accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. 1 34
And the majority opinion in United States v. Macintosh'135 referred to
128 Justice White stated:
I cannot hold that Congress violated the Clause in exempting from the draft all
those who oppose war by reason of religious training and belief. 398 U.S. at 369.
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 Id.
131 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 466-67 (1961).
132 398 U.S. at 369-70.
133 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
'34 Id. at 264, quoting United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931).
135 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
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the Court's decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts:36
[AInd yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without re-
gard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country and
risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. (emphasis added)'
13 7
These cases expressly denote the principle that the requirement of military
service is not a violation of First Amendment rights. They do not imply that
to require one to fight and kill for his country might not be opposed to and
inhibit one's exercise of his religious beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment is not violated by this requirement because this constitu-
tional guarantee is not absolute. In certain situations this constitutional
right must give way to stronger countervailing public policies. 88
Fighting in defense of one's country would seem to pursue an overriding
public policy. Since wars are fought to restore peace and tranquilty, en-
forcement of the requirement of military service does not violate the free-
dom of religion guarantee even though it might inhibit one's exercise of his
religious beliefs.
Justice White cited United States v. Sisson'3 9 to fortify his free exercise
argument. The court in Sisson held that section 6(j), in as much as it ex-
empted religious conscientious objectors but not Sisson, violated the Free
Exercise Clause, 40 but the court expressly stated that it did not hold that
"[t]he Government has no power to conscript the generality of men for com-
bat service . . "..,,41 In other words, the Congress does not have to
grant conscientious objector exemptions, but if it chooses to do so, it must
grant them to all who are conscientiously opposed to war, for to respect the
religious practices of some but not others, no matter how unorthodox, is to
inhibit, comparatively, the free exercise of religion of those excluded.
Justice White tried to overcome the legal precedents in this area by noting
that the Court is not the only body obliged to construe the Constitution
in its course of work. He noted that in Katzenbach v. Morgan 42 the
Court stated that it was sufficient "to perceive a basis upon which the Con-
gress might resolve the conflict as it did.' 143 He perceived such a basis for
section 6(j):144
136 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
137 283 U.S. at 624, quoting 197 U.S. at 29.
138 The United States Supreme Court has expressed such a principle where it held
that the right to Free Exercise of Religion of chosen form is not absolute, in that
"Eclonduct remains subject to regulation for protection of the society." Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
139 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1970).
140 297 F. Supp. at 911.
141 Id. at 912.
142 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
143 398 U.S. at 371, quoting 384 U.S. at 653.
144 398 U.S. at 371-72.
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We should thus not labor to find a violation of the Establishment Clause when free
exercise values prompt Congress to relieve religious believers from the burdens of
the law at least in those instances where the law is not merely prohibitory but
commands the performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man's re-
ligion.145
Justice White, in citing Katzenbach, overlooked one of the limitations of
the Court's holding. While the Court in Katzenbach did acknowledge that
great respect should be shown to the findings of Congress, it expressly held
that the remedies utilized by Congress may not be violative of any constitu-
tional provisions.146 In other words, congressional enactments within the
power of Congress are limited by other provisions of the Constitution, es-
pecially by those respecting individual rights. Justice White ignored this prin-
ciple when he found that the Establishment Clause does not restrict the
powers of Congress in enacting section 6(j) to comply with the free exercise
values. He appeared to balance these competing clauses, one against the
other. His conclusion that section 6(j) is not violative of the Establishment
Clause represented his view that in this instance the values of free exercise
of religion are to be preferred.
It is interesting to note that in subordinating the establishment values
to those of the Free Exercise Clause, Justice White was not confronted with
the doctrine of "neutrality" as applied by Justice Harlan. The latter's con-
cept of "neutrality" in the case required an analysis of the Establishment
Clause alone; he did not perceive a free exercise problem. Justice White,
because he perceived a conflict between the clauses, adopted a balancing
approach. His conclusion was that congressional provision for religious
conscientious objection avoids religious inhibition and should not be dis-
turbed.
However, the balancing approach ignores one very important factor which
is present here. In the case at hand the secular ends of section 6(j) could
have been achieved just as easily by drafting a conscientious objector exemp-
tion statute which would benefit not only religious conscientious objectors
but non-religious as well. If the statute was drafted in this manner it would
fulfill the requirements of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
Where it is possible to draft a statute which would achieve the congressional
end yet be wholly neutral in every sense of the word, there is no good rea-
son to let such deficient legislation stand.
The dissenting opinion offered an alternative ground for upholding Welsh's
conviction. Justice White took the position that since Welsh was among
that class of persons whom Congress had expressly denied exemption, he did
not have standing to raise the establishment issue even if section 6(j) did
145 Id. at 373.
146 384 U.S. at 648-51.
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present constitutional problems. Justice White quoted a passage from United
States v. Raines:14
7
[Olne to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. 148
This issue of standing was practically ignored by the Court in Engel'4
and Schempp.150  However in Schempp, Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, explained that part of the reason why the Court invoked the Es-
tablishment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause was that one need
not show that the statute operates in a coercive fashion against him to sup-
port an establishment violation. "Consequently it is much easier to satisfy
the 'standing' requirement in an establishment suit than in a free exercise
case."1 51
Moreover, one could argue that Welsh, as a member of the public, has as
much interest in preserving the First Amendment guarantee of separation of
church and state as any other citizen, and can thus act as a "non-hohfel-
dian" plaintiff.152
Furthermore, if only those who obtain the benefit of exemption under sec-
tion 6(j) have standing to raise its unconstitutionality, as a practical matter
section 6(j) might never be challenged.
In view of all of the above considerations Welsh might be said to have
standing to raise the establishment issue. However, as Justice White pointed
out, while Welsh might have attacked the constitutionality of section 6(j),
he was in no position to benefit from a decision holding the section uncon-
stitutional,153 unless of course, the Constitution requires that Welsh's non-
religious beliefs in opposition to war should be exempt from military service.
For example, assuming arguendo that Justice White is correct in his as-
sertion that the Free Exercise Clause requires Congress to provide exemp-
tions for religious conscientious objectors, and if Justice Harlan's view of the
Establishment Clause is accepted, then his "neutrality" principle would re-
quire that Congress construct a conscientious objector exemption section in
a manner that would not favor religious beliefs over non-religious beliefs.
In this situation Welsh would definitely be entitled to exemption if the Court
were willing to re-draft the statute to comply with the First Amendment, and
therefore Welsh could have standing to attack the constitutionality of section
6(j) and benefit from a decision holding the section unconstitutional.
Neither Justice Harlan nor Justice White took this position. As previously
147 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
148 398 U.S. at 368-69, quoting 362 U.S. at 21.
149 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
150 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
151 C. PRiTCHETT, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 578 (2d ed. 1968).
152 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
153 398 U.S. at 368-69.
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discussed, Justice White believed that the Free Exercise Clause did require
that Congress exempt religious conscientious objectors. He therefore found
no violation of the Establishment Clause.
On the other hand, Justice Harlan found that no constitutional provision
required exemption of religious conscientious objectors, yet "having chosen
to exempt, [Congress] cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic
religious beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other. Any such
distinctions are not, in my view, compatible with the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment."154
However, instead of declaring section 6(j) a nullity and removing any con-
scientious objector exemption from the Draft Act, Justice Harlan proposed
to remedy section 6(j)'s constitutional defects by "extend[ing] the coverage
of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by exclusion."'155 Since sec-
tion 6(j)'s defect was that of under-inclusion, Welsh could only benefit from
a declaration of its unconstitutionality by a redrafting of the section so as to
qualify his non-religious opposition to war for exemption. A reason for in-
voking the remedy of inclusion of non-religious beliefs is the long-standing
policy of Congress in providing some sort of conscientious objector exemp-
tion.
Justice Harlan concluded:
When a policy has roots so deeply embedded in history, there is a compelling rea-
son for a court to hazard the necessary statutory repairs if they can be made
within the administration framework of the statute and without impairing other
legislative goals, even though they entail, not simply eliminating an offending sec-
tion but rather building upon it. Thus I am prepared to accept the [Court's]
conscientious objector test, not as a reflection of congressional statutory intent
but as patchwork of judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion in
§60) and can be administered by local boards in the usual course of business.' 56
There is no strong authority in support of the remedy suggested by Jus-
tice Harlan. His main cited authority, Skinner v. Oklahoma,157 provides
only recognition of the available remedial alternative of inclusion:
It is by no means clear whether, if an excision were made, [referring to the sever-
ability clause] this particular constitutional difficulty might be solved by enlarg-
ing on the one hand or contracting on the other .... 158
Aside from the weakness of this authority, Justice Harlan's remedy of
re-drafting section 6(j) so as to include Welsh's non-religious beliefs raises
another problem. Justice Harlan's remedy is inconsistent with his view
that Congress was not constitutionally compelled to provide for religious ob-
jection to war in the first place. If one accepts the view that conscientious
154 Id. at 356.
155 Id. at 361.
156 Id. at 366-67 (footnote omitted).
157 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
158 Id. at 543.
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objection is a matter of legislative grace, and Congress unconstitutionally
attempts to exempt only religious conscientious objectors, there is no logical
reason why a court should be able to rewrite the defective statute in a manner
that would exempt religious as well as non-religious beliefs opposing war.
Such a remedy would be consistent only where religious conscientious ob-
jection is treated as a matter of right, and to avoid a statutory collision with
the Establishment Clause, non-religious beliefs must also be included.
Where there is no right to religious exemption, the logical solution to sec-
tion 6(j)'s unconstitutionality is to strike the section from the Draft Act
entirely. In such a situation, Justice White's argument that Welsh cannot
benefit from the section's unconstitutionality would foreclose any other re-
medial alternative.
Indeed, there is a long list of political and sociological considerations
which would deem it unwise to eliminate all conscientious objector exemp-
tions from the Draft Act by declaring section 6(j) a nullity due to its uncon-
stitutionality. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Justice Harlan was
indeed subjectively aware of the present social and political feelings of those
most affected by the Draft.
When the end sought is so very important to the community, and there
remains no road to reach this end except the road of a judicial statu-
tory construction clearly perverting the purpose behind the enactment, then,
as here, rationalization for such a departure from the will of Congress may be
found.
However, the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan achieves the same so-
cially, as well as legally desirable result without resorting to a mythical in-
terpretation of section 6(j). He faces the constitutional issue head-on. His re-
drafting of section 6(j) to include non-religious beliefs in opposition to war
in order to cure its constitutional defects does raise some problems.
His remedy is as much an instance of judicial legislation perverting the
purpose of a statute as is the majority opinion. Its logical inconsistency
could be cured by admitting to a constitutional requirement which would
exempt religious conscientious objectors from military service. However,
the fact still remains that merely striking the section would seem to be the
legally correct approach.
Although the Welsh decision will have a marked impact, it will very likely
be considered in conjunction with the 1967 Act, 5 9 which deleted the
"Supreme Being" clause from the 1948 Act. The effect of that deletion
requires interpretation. If the intent as stated by Congressman Rivers, the
late Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was to narrow
Seeger, and return to the Berman definition of religious training and belief, 00
then the present Act has severe constitutional defects. However, Senator
159 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. V, 1970).
160 113 CONG. REc. 14140 (1967) (remarks of Congressman Rivers).
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Russell, the late Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the
Senate did not accept the House explanation of the bill and in his opinion
the Act did not overrule Seeger.161
Congressman River's opinion as to the 1967 Act is hard to accept.
Eliminating the "Supreme Being" clause would be a strange way of over-
ruling Seeger. If this was truly the intent of Congress, a clearer approach
would have been to replace the "Supreme Being" phrase with the word
",God",.6 2
In United States v. Levy,163 it was held that
the 1967 Act in eliminating reference to a "Supreme Being" and retaining the "re-
ligious training and belief" clause has worked no change in the requirements for a
conscientious objector classification, and the construction placed upon the 1948
Act in the Seeger case is the applicable standard.' 0 -
Hence, since the majority opinion purports to base its decision upon the
Seeger case, the Welsh decision would therefore apply with equal force to the
present conscientious objector statute. The fact that the Welsh majority
opinion does take note of the 1967 Amendment and the manner of its
notation, supports this conclusion.0 5
The majority opinion represents an instance of judicial consideration of the
feelings of a large part of our society; the results it achieves coincide to a
large extent with the temper of the times.
This highly desirable result does not come without its costs. The fictions
that the majority opinion would have us accept concerning legislative intent,
objective evidence to the contrary, represent a dangerous means of achieving
this result. As long as the Court desires to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion it will be forced to pursue its path of distorted judicial construction to
achieve the same end that Justice Harlan obtained in his concurring opinion.
Notwithstanding this distortion the result is now the law. The Court's
decision has now dramatically broadened the class to which conscientious
objector exemption will be granted. In holding that all sincere, religious,
ethical and moral beliefs can qualify for an exemption the Court has opened
the door to many to whom it had been closed for a very long time.
Michael Carl Cohen
David C. Wright
161 113 CONG. REc. H. 6285 (Daily ed. May 25, 1967).
162 United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir. 1969).
103 419 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1969).
164 Id. at 366.
105 398 U.S. at 336 n.2.
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